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Abstract This paper considers a generalization of the processor load bal-
ancing game also known as KP-model. A linear delay of a processor may
depend on not only its load but on loads of other processors. Players choose
processors of dierent speeds to run their jobs striving to minimize job's
delay, i.e., the job completion time on a chosen processor. The social cost is
the maximum delay over all processors. We propose a computing algorithm
of the exact PoA value which can be applied to estimate the POA visually if
its exact analytical expression is not obtained yet or it is rather complicated
to gure out its formula.
Keywords: processor load balancing game, Nash equilibrium, price of an-
archy, linear functional, computation.
1. Introduction
Load balancing represents a major problem in networks and distributed com-
puting systems, since load optimization guarantees ecient resource utilization.
Modern systems such as telecommunication networks, cloud computing systems,
GRID, etc. consist of independent components, in many cases without their cen-
tralized control. Particularly, users located at nodes and data transmission protocols
do not interact with each other for maintaining a certain load level. Furthermore,
in practice they demonstrate egoistic behavior with respect to free resources. The
game-theoretic approach allows treating load balancing as a game, where players
have egoistic behavior and can reach some equilibrium state such that none of them
benets from unilateral deviation from a chosen strategy. System eciency is as-
sessed by comparing the above equilibria with the global optimum.
The present paper focuses on a generalization of the machine load balancing
game in the form of the KP-model (see Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) with
parallel dierent-capacity channels. It is necessary to distribute several jobs of var-
ious volumes among processors of nonidentical speeds. The volume of a job is its
completion time on a free unit-speed processor when all other processors are idle.
Processor load is the total volume of jobs executed by a given processor. A linear
delay of a processor, i.e. completion time for all jobs on this processor, may depend
on not only its load but on loads of other processors. Each player chooses a proces-
sor for its job striving to minimize job's delay. Players have egoistic behavior and
reach a Nash equilibrium, viz., a job distribution such that none of them benets
from unilateral change of a chosen processor. In the sequel, we study pure strategies
Nash equilibria only; as is well-known (Fotakis et al., 2002) for the original KP-
model such an equilibrium always exists. The system cost (also called the social
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cost) is the maximum delay over all processors for an obtained job distribution.
The price of anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) (PoA) is dened as
the maximum ratio of the social cost in the worst-case Nash equilibrium and the
optimal social cost.
The POA evaluating is an important problem, since this value is an indicator
of the system quality. It shows how a non-cooperative players behavior cold be
worse than cooperative. Sometimes in special cases it is possible to nd an exact
analytical expression for the POA value, as for two-processors system in the KP-
model (Epstein, 2010), or some its upper estimation, as for such three-processors
system (Chirkova, 2015).
Numerical computing of the POA value and its graphical presentation allows
estimating the POA visually if its exact analytical expression is not obtained yet or
it is rather complicated to gure out its formula. We propose a computing algorithm
of the exact PoA value. This is a generalization of the computing method for the
original KP-model, presented in Chirkova, 2015. Here a linear delay of a processor
may depend on not only its load but on loads of other processors.
2. The model
Consider a system of N processors of dierent performances. The system is used
by a set of players U = U(n,w): each of n players chooses an appropriate processor




wj the total volume of all jobs.
We study the following pure strategies game. Each player can choose any proces-
sor. The strategy of player j is processor lj selected by this player for its job execu-
tion. Then the strategy prole in the game Γ represents the vector L = (l1, . . . , ln).
The load of processor i, i.e., the total volume of all jobs assigned to the processor
is dened by δi(L) =
∑
j=1,...,n:lj=i
wj . The delay of processor i takes the form of a
linear functional
λi(L) = (αi1, . . . , αiN )(δ1(L), . . . , δN (L))
T
for the vector of processor loads and a vector αi ∈ RN . Actually, this quantity is
the same for all players selecting a given processor. Denote also S = S(N,λ) the
system of N processors with given delays λ. Therefore the game is described by
Γ (S,U) =< S(N,λ), U(n,w) >.





OPT = OPT (S,U) = min
L is a prole in Γ (S,U,λ)
SC(L)
the optimal cost (the social cost in the optimal case), where minimization runs over
all admissible strategy proles in the game Γ (S,U).
A strategy prole L such that none player benets from unilateral deviation
(change of the processor chosen in L for its job execution) is a pure strategies Nash
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equilibrium. To provide a formal denition, let L(j → i) = (l1, . . . , lj−1, i, lj+1, . . . , ln)
signify the prole obtained from a prole L if player j replaces processor lj chosen
by it in the prole L for another processor i, whereas the rest players keep the same
strategies as before.
Denition 1. A strategy prole L is said to be a pure strategies Nash equilibrium
i each player chooses a processor with the minimum delay, i.e., for each player
j = 1, . . . , n we have the inequality λlj (L) ≤ λi(L(j → i)) for all processors i =
1, . . . , N .
Note that while the original KP-model always has a pure Nash equilibrium (Fo-
takis et al., 2002), in our generalized case the game may not to possess any pure
Nash equilibrium.
Example 1. Here is an example of simple game which does not have any pure NE.
Consider the game with two jobs of volumes 1 and three processors of speeds 1.
The following delays are given: λ1(L) = δ1(L) + ϵδ2(L), λ2(L) = δ2(L) + ϵδ3(L),
λ3(L) = δ3(L) + ϵδ1(L). Consider an arbitrary prole, e.g. L = (1, 2). The rst job
obtains a delay 1 + ϵ, the second one obtains 1. The rst job migrates to the free
processor 3 and obtains a delay 1. Then the second job delay increases to 1 + ϵ
and forces it to migrate to the rst processor which becomes idle. It increases the
rst job delay, which needs to migrate to the processor 2. Repeating the process we
obtain an innite prole loop (1, 2) → (3, 2) → (3, 1) → (2, 1) → (2, 3) → (1, 3) →
(1, 2)→ . . . .
Further we assume that the system and job sets are such that the game possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium. We dene Price of Anarchy of the corresponding system
as follows.
Denition 2. The price of anarchy in the system S is the maximum ratio of the









According to the following result, for PoA evaluation it suces to consider only
games, where the optimal social cost equals 1.




L is a Nash equilibrium in the game Γ (S,U1)
SC(L).
Proof. Assume that L is the worst-case equilibrium in the game Γ (S,U) with an
arbitrary set of players U(n,w). For each player j, the volume of its job equals
wj , and the vector LOPT gives the optimal strategy prole in this game. Denote a
load δ′i = δi(L) for each processor i in the equilibrium L in this game. Let SC and
OPT be the social cost in the prole L and the optimal social cost, respectively.
The ratio of the worst-case and optimal social cost is dened by SCOPT . So long as









k + wj(αii − αilj ) for any processor i.
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Now, explore the game with the same set of processors and players, where each
player j has the job of volume
wj
OPT . Then for any processor i its load is
δ′i
OPT . The
social cost in the proles L and LOPT constitutes
SC
OPT and 1, respectively. Now
let's show that L and LOPT form the worst-case and optimal proles, respectively,
in the new game. Particularly, the prole L is an equilibrium in the new game, since













for any processor i. Imagine that L is any non-worst-case equilibrium in the new
game. Then the game admits an equilibrium L′ with social cost SC
′
OPT such that the





in the initial game the prole L′ corresponds to the social cost SC ′ > SC, and the
equilibrium L′ is worse than its counterpart L. Similarly, LOPT gives the optimal
prole in the new game. Then the ratio of the worst-case and optimal social cost in
the new game also equals SCOPT .
Consequently, any game Γ (S,U) corresponds to a game Γ (S,U1) with normal-
ized job volumes such that OPT (S,U1) = 1. Moreover, the ratio of the worst-case
and optimal social cost is same in both games. Hence, for PoA evaluation it suces
to consider only games with unit optimal social cost.
3. Evaluating the POA in the 3-processor model
We suggest a computing method for the price of anarchy in the system of 3
processors. This method can be generalized to systems composed of more processors.
But such generalization increases the number of linear programming problems to-
be-solved and the number of associated variables and imposed constraints.
Consider the following system of linear equations in the components of the vec-
tors a = (a1, a2, a3), b = (b1, b2, b3), c = (c1, c2, c3). Denote A(a) = a1 + a2 + a3,
B(b) = b1 + b2 + b3, C(c) = c1 + c2 + c3, ∆(a, b, c) = (A(a), B(b), C(c))
T , αk =
(αk1, αk2, αk3). Numbers i, j, l are components of the set of processor numbers
1, 2, 3 so that i ̸= j ̸= l ̸= i.
αi∆(a, b, c) ≤ αj∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:ak>0
ak(αjj − αji)
αi∆(a, b, c) ≤ αl∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:ak>0
ak(αll − αli)
αj∆(a, b, c) ≤ αl∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:bk>0
bk(αll − αlj) or max
k=1,2,3
bk = 0
αi∆(a, b, c) ≥ αj∆(a, b, c) ≥ αl∆(a, b, c)
ak, bk, ck ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3.
(1)
This system describes a set of hyperplanes passing through the point
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) in the 9-dimensional space, and the solution set represents
a domain in the space bounded by the hyperplanes. If the above system is feasible
and (a, b, c) is its solution, then for any real number β > 0, a set (βa, βb, βc) is a
solution too. Furthermore, the solution set is unbounded, since β can be arbitrarily
large.
Study the system S composed of 3 processors with numbers i, j, l and n players.
Let L indicate a Nash equilibrium in the system S such that processor i has a maxi-
mal delay in this prole, processor j has a medium delay and processor l has a min-
imal, otherwise we may re-enumerate processors. Suppose that in the equilibrium L
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b1 + b2 + b3 and
∑
k=1,...,n:lk=l
wk = c1 + c2 + c3, respectively. The volume of jobs
on each processor is somehow divided into three parts so that each component of
the three-dimensional vectors a, b and c is either zero or positive and includes at
least one job.
Lemma 1. Let L be a Nash equilibrium in the game involving three processors i, j
and l, and n players such that
λi(L) ≥ λj(L) ≥ λl(L),∑
k=1,...,n:lk=i
wk = a1 + a2 + a3,∑
k=1,...,n:lk=j
wk = b1 + b2 + b3,∑
k=1,...,n:lk=l
wk = c1 + c2 + c3.
Here for all k = i, j, l component ak equals zero or the volume of at least one job on
processor i, component bk equals zero or the volume of at least one job on processor
j, and component ck equals zero or the volume of at least one job on processor l.
Then the set of the vectors a, b and c is the solution of the system (1).
Proof. Suppose that L represents a Nash equilibrium and λi(L) ≥ λj(L) ≥ λl(L).
Denote δ(L) = (δi(L), δj(L), δl(L))
T a vector-column of the processors loads. In this
case, the following inequalities take place:
αiδi(L) ≤ αjδj(L) + min
k=1,...,n:lk=i,wk>0
wk(αjj − αji)
αiδi(L) ≤ αlδl(L) + min
k=1,...,n:lk=i,wk>0
wk(αll − αli)
αjδj(L) ≤ αlδl(L) + min
k=1,...,n:lk=j,wk>0
wk(αll − αlj) or max
k=1,...,n:lk=j
wk = 0
αiδi(L) ≥ αjδj(L) ≥ αlδl(L).
It's clear that δ(L) = ∆(a, b, c). Since each nonzero quantity ak (k = 1, 2, 3)














wk. This means satisfaction of the system (1).
Lemma 2. Any nonzero solution of the system (1) denes a Nash equilibrium L
in the game involving the system S composed of 3 processors i, j and l and players
whose jobs correspond to the nonzero components of the vectors a, b and c and the
delays are sorted in the order λi(L) ≥ λj(L) ≥ λl(L).
Proof. Assume that the set of the vectors a, b and c gives the solution of the sys-
tem (1). Consider the game with 3 processors i, j and l. Let each nonzero component
of the vectors a, b and c specify the job volume of a regular player. Consider a prole
L such that the jobs of volumes ak > 0, bk > 0 and ck > 0 are assigned to proces-
sors i, j and l, respectively. So long as all inequalities (1) hold true, the prole L
gives the desired Nash equilibrium.
The following result is immediate.
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Theorem 2. Any Nash equilibrium L in the game involving the system S composed
of 3 processors i, j and l and n players corresponds to a Nash equilibrium L′ in
the game involving the same system S and at most 9 players, where each processor
receives no more than 3 jobs and the delays on all processors in L and L′ do coincide.
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium L in the game with the system S of 3 processors
and n players. Number the processors so that λi(L) ≥ λj(L) ≥ λl(L). According to
Lemma 1, for any Nash equilibrium in the game involving the system S and any
number of players there exist a corresponding solution a, b, c of the system (1). By
virtue of Lemma 2, this solution determines a Nash equilibrium L′ in the game with
the system S such that the nonzero components of the vectors a, b and c specify
the job volumes on processors i, j and l, respectively. By denition, the element
sum of the vector a represents the load of processor i in a prole L. Hence, delays
on processor i coincide in both equilibria L and L′. Similarly, for processors j and
l the delays in the equilibrium L coincide with the corresponding delays in the
equilibrium L′.
This theorem claims that it is sucient to consider only games, where in an
equilibrium each processor receives at most three jobs and the equilibrium solves
the system (1). And the domain of the social cost coincides with the value domain
of games with an arbitrary number of players.
Imagine that the components of the vectors a, b and c are chosen as follows. In
the optimal prole yielding the minimum social cost, processors i, j and l receive
the total volumes of jobs a1+ b1+ c1, a2+ b2+ c2 and a3+ b3+ c3, respectively, and
the highest delay can be on each of them. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, the volumes
of jobs are assumed to be normalized so that in the optimal prole the maximum
delay among all processors equals 1. In our case, this means that
αii(a1 + b1 + c1) + αij(a2 + b2 + c2) + αil(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
αji(a1 + b1 + c1) + αjj(a2 + b2 + c2) + αjl(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
αli(a1 + b1 + c1) + αlj(a2 + b2 + c2) + αll(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
and at least one of these inequalities holds as an equality.
Denote now the linear programming problem LPP (i, j, l) where i, j and l are
numbers assigned with processors.
Lemma 3. A nonzero solution of the linear programming problem LPP (i, j, l):
αi∆(a, b, c)→ max
(r1) αi∆(a, b, c) ≤ αj∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:ak>0
ak(αjj − αji)
(r2) αi∆(a, b, c) ≤ αl∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:ak>0
ak(αll − αli)
(r3) αj∆(a, b, c) ≤ αl∆(a, b, c) + min
k=1,2,3:bk>0
bk(αll − αlj) or max
k=1,2,3
bk = 0
(r4) αi∆(a, b, c) ≥ αj∆(a, b, c) ≥ αl∆(a, b, c)
(r5) ak, bk, ck ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, 3
(r6) αii(a1 + b1 + c1) + αij(a2 + b2 + c2) + αil(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
(r7) αji(a1 + b1 + c1) + αjj(a2 + b2 + c2) + αjl(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
(r8) αli(a1 + b1 + c1) + αlj(a2 + b2 + c2) + αll(a3 + b3 + c3) ≤ 1,
(2)
with respect to the components of the vectors a, b and c provides the maximum social
cost in a Nash equilibrium among all games, where in an equilibrium at most 3 jobs
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are assigned to each processor, i, j and l indicate the numbers of the processors in
the descending order of their delays and the optimal social cost makes up 1.
Proof. Due to Lemma 2, any solution of inequalities (r1) − (r5) in the problem
LPP (i, j, l) denes an equilibrium in the game with 3 processors, where each pro-
cessor receives at most 3 jobs and i, j, and l are the numbers of processors in the
descending order of their delays.
The goal function in this game is bounded above only by the hyperplanes cor-
responding to inequalities (r6) − (r8). Actually, inequalities (r1) − (r5) admit ar-
bitrarily large values of the goal function, since if (a, b, c) is their solution, then for
any real number β > 0, a set (βa, βb, βc) is a solution too. Therefore, the maximum
is reached on one of the boundaries answering to the last three inequalities. This
guarantees that one of them is satised as an equality, ergo the optimal cost in the
game corresponding to the solution of the problem LPP (i, j, l) equals 1.
Consequently, exact PoA evaluation for the system S composed of 3 processors
calls for solving a series of linear programming methods LPP (i, j, l) for all permu-
tations of processors. And the maximum solution among them yields the value of
PoA(S). In other words, it is possible to establish the following fact.
Theorem 3. For the system S composed of 3 processors, the price of anarchy con-
stitutes
PoA(S) = max
(i,j,l)are permutations of (1,2,3)
{αi∆(a, b, c)|a, b, c is a solution of LPP (i, j, l)} ,
where LPP (i, j, l) is the linear programming problem (2).
Proof. According to Lemma 3, the solution of the problem (2) gives the maximum
social cost in a Nash equilibrium, where i, j and l are the numbers of the processors
in the descending order of their delays, among all games such that in an equilibrium
each processor receives at most 3 jobs and the optimal cost equals 1. The maximum
solution among the problems for all admissible permutations of processors (1, 2, 3)
provides the maximum social cost in a Nash equilibrium among all games, where in
an equilibrium at most 3 jobs are assigned to each processor and the optimal cost
equal 1.
By Theorem 2, for any equilibrium in the game involving the system S of 3
processors and an arbitrary number of players, it is possible to construct a corre-
sponding equilibrium in the game with the same processors and a set of at most
9 players, where each processor receives no more than 3 jobs and the social cost
coincides for both equilibria. Thus, for PoA evaluation it suces to consider only
games, where in an equilibrium each processor has at most 3 jobs.
Using Theorem 1, we nally obtain that for PoA evaluation it suces to consider
only games, where the social cost in the optimal prole equal 1.
4. The POA for the game with linear externalities
Consider the game with linear externalities (Chirkova, 2021a) as a special case
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Here vi is the speed of the processor i, and each externality coecient eik reects
the impact of the load of the processor k into the delay of the processor i.
Also we assume the following:
1. For each processor pairs i ̸= k the inequality eik < 1vi holds.
2. For each processor pairs i ̸= k it holds that eki < 1vi .






It is established (Chirkova, 2021a; Chirkova, 2021b) that there is at least one a
pure Nash equilibrium in the game with linear externalities for the system of two
processors. Moreover an expression for an exact value of the POA for the system of
two processors with speeds 1 ≤ s is found (Chirkova, 2021a). It equals to









and η = 1 + s− s(e12 + e21), ζ = 1− se12e21.
But rst the values of the POA for this model were found numerically to provide
a visual estimation of the possibility to obtain an analytical expression and conrm
its correctness. As the considered model is a special case of the generalized model
with linear delays, similarly we obtain the linear programming problem LPP (i, j):
a1+a2
vi
+ eij(b1 + b2)→ max
a1+a2
vi







+ eij(b1 + b2) ≥ b1+b2vj + eji(a1 + a2)
ak, bk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2
a1+b1
vi
+ eij(a2 + b2) ≤ 1
a2+b2
vj
+ eji(a1 + b1) ≤ 1.
(4)
The following theorem is a special case of the Theorem 3 reduced to two pro-
cessors.
Theorem 4. For the system S composed of 2 processors, the price of anarchy con-
stitutes
PoA(S) = max
(i,j)are permutations of (1,2){
a1+a2
vi
+ eij(b1 + b2)|a, b is a solution of LPP (i, j)
}
,
where LPP (i, j) is the linear programming problem (4).
4.1. Numerical examples
To estimate the price of anarchy in the two-machine model with linear exter-
nalities, we have developed a program allowing visual estimation of the the POA
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exact value constructed by solving a series of linear programming problems. The
parameters of the system S act as the options in the program; by assumption, the
speed of machine 1 equals 1, whereas a certain range is for the speed of a machine
2. In this case, users can study the PoA dynamics under variations in the speed of
one machine.
The Figure 1 presents examples of evaluated POA values in the model with two
processors for dierent values of s. The Fig. 1 a) shows the POA for the externality
values e12 = 0.11 and e21 = 0.1. The Fig. 1 b) presents the case when externalities
are e12 = 0.3 and e21 = 0.1.
All numerically evaluated POA values coincide with corresponding values given
by the analytical expression (3). In addition, the program randomly generates var-
ious sets of jobs U , nds for each resulting game Γ (S,U) the ratio of the system
costs in the worst case Nash equilibrium to the optimal costs and displays the corre-
sponding points on the gure. All these points are located below the obtained POA






















1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
s
PoA(s)
Fig. 1. The POA for the system S with a) e12 = 0.11, e21 = 0.1, b) e12 = 0.3, e21 = 0.1.
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored the service system composed of N machines and n play-
ers and derived the algorithm to compute an exact value for the price of anarchy in
the load balancing game with linear delays. The three-machine model has been an-
alyzed in detail. We have proposed a computing algorithm of the exact PoA value.
The algorithm can be generalized to systems with more machines, but this increases
the number of linear programming problems to-be-solved and the number of asso-
ciated variables and imposed constraints. Also similarly we can compute the POA
value for the game of maximizing the minimal processor delay (Epstein et al., 2009;
Chirkova, 2017; Chirkova, 2021b), considering the minimal delay among processors
as a target maximized function. Finally, we have implemented the algorithm as a
program and conducted numerical experiments for visual estimates of the PoA in
the game with two processors and linear externalities, always possessing a pure Nash
equilibrium. The results of these experiments have demonstrated the correctness of
the derived algorithm.
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